Showing posts with label Financial. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Financial. Show all posts

Friday, October 11, 2013

US CFTC fines Vision Financial for second time this week

By Tom Polansek

CHICAGO, Sept 27 | Fri Sep 27, 2013 5:35pm EDT

CHICAGO, Sept 27 (Reuters) - The U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission fined Vision Financial Markets $525,000 on Friday for illegally commingling customer money with company funds.

It was the second penalty this week against the broker, which raised its profile in the futures industry last year by absorbing the accounts of former customers of bankrupt brokerage Peregrine Financial Group.

David Stein, Vision's general counsel, could not be reached for comment. The firm agreed to settle with the CFTC in both instances without admitting or denying wrongdoing.

From August 2008 to June 2009, Vision used funds from commodity futures and options customers to buy corporate notes and bonds and then commingled those assets with its own funds and the funds of its securities customers, the CFTC said.

Customer funds are supposed to be "segregated," or kept separate, so the money can be available for clients to trade with or withdraw.

Vision's violations went undetected because the broker did not notify regulators that the amount of money in segregated accounts did not meet requirements, according to the CFTC.

The agency requires that customer funds be separately accounted for and that brokers hold sufficient funds in customer segregated accounts to meet their obligations to clients.

Vision "misstated in monthly segregation statements filed with the commission the location and manner in which the customer funds were being held," the CFTC said.

The violations were discovered during a regulatory check in June 2009, according to the CFTC, which did not explain why it did not impose the fine until now.

The CFTC on Tuesday fined Vision $140,000 for failing to supervise employees handling futures accounts in 2012.

Peregrine's trustee, Ira Bodenstein, selected Vision to take on customer accounts last year because Vision offered the highest bid, said Robert Fishman, a lawyer for the trustee. Vision paid about $325,000.

"We'd never heard of them before," Fishman said about Vision on Friday. "Their bid was the best bid and that was all we needed to know about it."

Peregrine collapsed in July 2012 after founder Russell Wasendorf Sr. attempted suicide and confessed to stealing tens of thousands of dollars from customers over two decades.


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Sunday, June 30, 2013

Legal Protection in Retail Financial Markets

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Contact Us My Basket My Account Review of Corporate Finance Studies About This Journal Contact This Journal Subscriptions View Current Issue (Volume 2 Issue 1 March 2013) Archive Search Oxford Journals EconomicsSocial Sciences Review of Corporate Finance Studies Volume 1 Issue 1 Pp. 68-108. Legal Protection in Retail Financial Markets Bruce Ian Carlin
University of California, Los Angeles Simon Gervais
Duke University Send correspondence to Bruce Ian Carlin, Anderson School of Management, University of California, Los Angeles, 110 Westwood Plaza Suite C413, Los Angeles, CA 90095; telephone: (310) 825-7246. E-mail: bruce.carlin{at}anderson.ucla.edu; or to Simon Gervais, Fuqua School of Business, Duke University, 100 Fuqua Drive, Durham, NC 27708-0120; telephone: (919) 660-7683. E-mail: sgervais{at}duke.edu. Abstract We model a retail financial institution that outsources its advice services to an intermediary, making the two parties jointly responsible for consumers' experience with the products. In this context, courts that enforce state-contingent legal rules are necessary in order to avoid market breakdowns. To maximize social welfare, the government implements a system of penalties that depends on product characteristics and on the firm's relative ability to control quality. This legal system emphasizes reliable advice over transaction pace. Furthermore, the implicit team structure of the firm and its intermediary prevents self-regulation from achieving the same social efficiency. (JEL G18, G28, D11, D18, L51, K20)

© The Author 2012. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Society for Financial Studies. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oup.com. « Previous | Next Article » Table of Contents This Article Review of Corporate Finance Studies (2012) 1 (1): 68-108. doi: 10.1093/rcfs/cfs003 First published online: July 26, 2012 » Abstract Full Text (HTML) Full Text (PDF) All Versions of this Article: cfs003v1 1/1/68 most recent Classifications Articles Services Alert me when cited Alert me if corrected Find similar articles Similar articles in Web of Science Add to my archive Download citation Request Permissions Citing Articles Load citing article information Citing articles via CrossRef Citing articles via Scopus Citing articles via Web of Science Citing articles via Google Scholar Google Scholar Articles by Carlin, B. I. Articles by Gervais, S. Search for related content Related Content Load related web page information Share Email this article Add to CiteULikeCiteULike Add to DeliciousDelicious Add to FacebookFacebook Add to Google+Google+ Add to MendeleyMendeley Add to TwitterTwitter What's this?

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Saturday, June 29, 2013

Financial Development, Fixed Costs, and International Trade

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Contact Us My Basket My Account Review of Corporate Finance Studies About This Journal Contact This Journal Subscriptions View Current Issue (Volume 2 Issue 1 March 2013) Archive Search Oxford Journals EconomicsSocial Sciences Review of Corporate Finance Studies Volume 2 Issue 1 Pp. 1-28. Financial Development, Fixed Costs, and International Trade Bo Becker
Harvard Business School and NBER Jinzhu Chen
Chinese Academy of Social Sciences David Greenberg
BlackRock, Inc. Send correspondence to Bo Becker, Harvard Business School, Boston, MA 02163, USA; telephone: 617-496-5335. E-mail: bbecker{at}hbs.edu. Abstract Exports require significant up-front costs in product design, marketing, and distribution. These are intangible, firm-specific investments that are likely difficult to finance externally. We argue that a developed financial system can therefore facilitate exports. We test this prediction and find support for it. First, financial development is associated with more exports in industries in which fixed costs are high as well as to importers that require high costs. Second, trade dynamics are affected by financial development. In countries with better finance, exports are more sensitive to exchange rates. Finally, we predict and document that countries with more developed finance experience more volatile exports. (JEL F14, F36, G20, G30)

© The Author 2012. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Society for Financial Studies. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oup.com. « Previous | Next Article » Table of Contents This Article Review of Corporate Finance Studies (2013) 2 (1): 1-28. doi: 10.1093/rcfs/cfs005 First published online: November 28, 2012 » Abstract Full Text (HTML) Full Text (PDF) All Versions of this Article: cfs005v1 2/1/1 most recent Classifications Articles Services Alert me when cited Alert me if corrected Find similar articles Similar articles in Web of Science Add to my archive Download citation Request Permissions Citing Articles Load citing article information Citing articles via CrossRef Citing articles via Scopus Citing articles via Web of Science Google Scholar Articles by Becker, B. Articles by Greenberg, D. Search for related content Related Content Load related web page information Share Email this article Add to CiteULikeCiteULike Add to DeliciousDelicious Add to FacebookFacebook Add to Google+Google+ Add to MendeleyMendeley Add to TwitterTwitter What's this?

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Advanced » Current Issue March 2013 2 (1) Review of Corporate Finance Studies Alert me to new issues The Journal About the journal Rights & permissions Dispatch date of the next issue Published on behalf of Society for Financial Studies Executive Editor Paolo Fulghieri View full editorial board For Authors Services for authors Instructions to authors Self-archiving policy Editors’ Joint Policy Statement Regarding “Coercive Citations” Corporate Services What we offer Advertising sales Reprints Supplements Alerting Services Email table of contents Email Advance Access XML RSS feed JEL Alerts Sign Up Most Most Read A Theory of Arbitrage Capital Bank Bailout Menus Financial Development, Fixed Costs, and International Trade Takeover Bidding and Shareholder Information Bridging the Gap? Government Subsidized Lending and Access to Capital » View all Most Read articles

Disclaimer: Please note that abstracts for content published before 1996 were created through digital scanning and may therefore not exactly replicate the text of the original print issues. All efforts have been made to ensure accuracy, but the Publisher will not be held responsible for any remaining inaccuracies. If you require any further clarification, please contact our Customer Services Department.

Online ISSN 2046-9136 - Print ISSN 2046-9128 Copyright ©  2013  Society for Financial Studies Oxford Journals Oxford University Press Site Map Privacy Policy Cookie Policy Legal Notices Frequently Asked Questions Other Oxford University Press sites: Oxford University Press Oxford Journals China Oxford Journals Japan Academic & Professional books Children's & Schools Books Dictionaries & Reference Dictionary of National Biography Digital Reference English Language Teaching Higher Education Textbooks International Education Unit Law Medicine Music Online Products & Publishing Oxford Bibliographies Online Oxford Dictionaries Online Oxford English Dictionary Oxford Language Dictionaries Online Oxford Scholarship Online Reference Rights and Permissions Resources for Retailers & Wholesalers Resources for the Healthcare Industry Very Short Introductions World's Classics

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Thursday, June 27, 2013

Negotiating with Labor under Financial Distress

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Contact Us My Basket My Account Review of Corporate Finance Studies About This Journal Contact This Journal Subscriptions View Current Issue (Volume 2 Issue 1 March 2013) Archive Search Oxford Journals EconomicsSocial Sciences Review of Corporate Finance Studies Volume 1 Issue 1 Pp. 28-67. Negotiating with Labor under Financial Distress Efraim Benmelech
Harvard University and NBER Nittai K. Bergman
MIT Sloan and NBER Ricardo J. Enriquez
Protego - Evercore Address correspondence to Efraim Benmelech, Department of Economics, Harvard University, Littauer Center, Cambridge, MA 02138. E-mail: effi_benmelech{at}harvard.edu. Abstract We analyze how firms renegotiate labor contracts to extract concessions from labor. While anecdotal evidence suggests that firms tend to renegotiate wages downward in times of financial distress, there is no empirical evidence that documents such renegotiation, its determinants, and its magnitude. This article attempts to fill this gap. Using a unique data set of airlines, which includes detailed information on wages and pension plans, we document an empirical link between airline financial distress, pension underfunding, and wage concessions. (JEL G23, G33, J31, J33, L93)

© The Author 2012. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Society for Financial Studies. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oup.com. « Previous | Next Article » Table of Contents This Article Review of Corporate Finance Studies (2012) 1 (1): 28-67. doi: 10.1093/rcfs/cfr001 First published online: February 7, 2012 » Abstract Full Text (HTML) Full Text (PDF) All Versions of this Article: cfr001v1 1/1/28 most recent Classifications Articles Services Alert me when cited Alert me if corrected Find similar articles Similar articles in Web of Science Add to my archive Download citation Request Permissions Citing Articles Load citing article information Citing articles via CrossRef Citing articles via Scopus Citing articles via Web of Science Citing articles via Google Scholar Google Scholar Articles by Benmelech, E. Articles by Enriquez, R. J. Search for related content Related Content Load related web page information Share Email this article Add to CiteULikeCiteULike Add to DeliciousDelicious Add to FacebookFacebook Add to Google+Google+ Add to MendeleyMendeley Add to TwitterTwitter What's this?

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Advanced » Current Issue March 2013 2 (1) Review of Corporate Finance Studies Alert me to new issues The Journal About the journal Rights & permissions Dispatch date of the next issue Published on behalf of Society for Financial Studies Executive Editor Paolo Fulghieri View full editorial board For Authors Services for authors Instructions to authors Self-archiving policy Editors’ Joint Policy Statement Regarding “Coercive Citations” Corporate Services What we offer Advertising sales Reprints Supplements Alerting Services Email table of contents Email Advance Access XML RSS feed JEL Alerts Sign Up Most Most Read A Theory of Arbitrage Capital Bank Bailout Menus Financial Development, Fixed Costs, and International Trade Takeover Bidding and Shareholder Information Bridging the Gap? Government Subsidized Lending and Access to Capital » View all Most Read articles

Disclaimer: Please note that abstracts for content published before 1996 were created through digital scanning and may therefore not exactly replicate the text of the original print issues. All efforts have been made to ensure accuracy, but the Publisher will not be held responsible for any remaining inaccuracies. If you require any further clarification, please contact our Customer Services Department.

Online ISSN 2046-9136 - Print ISSN 2046-9128 Copyright ©  2013  Society for Financial Studies Oxford Journals Oxford University Press Site Map Privacy Policy Cookie Policy Legal Notices Frequently Asked Questions Other Oxford University Press sites: Oxford University Press Oxford Journals China Oxford Journals Japan Academic & Professional books Children's & Schools Books Dictionaries & Reference Dictionary of National Biography Digital Reference English Language Teaching Higher Education Textbooks International Education Unit Law Medicine Music Online Products & Publishing Oxford Bibliographies Online Oxford Dictionaries Online Oxford English Dictionary Oxford Language Dictionaries Online Oxford Scholarship Online Reference Rights and Permissions Resources for Retailers & Wholesalers Resources for the Healthcare Industry Very Short Introductions World's Classics

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